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Abstract
The debate concerning the ontological status of spacetime is standardly
construed as a dilemma between substantivalism and relationalism. I ar-
gue that a trilemma is more appropriate, emergent spacetime theories
being the third category. Traditional philosophical arguments do not
distinguish between emergent spacetime and substantivalism. It is ar-
guments from physics that suggest giving up substantivalism in favour
of emergent spacetime theories. The remaining new dilemma is between
emergent spacetime and relationalism. I provide a list of questions, which
one should consider when discussing emergent spacetime theories, and
apply them to a quantum superfluid toy model of emergent spacetime.
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1 A third candidate: emergent spacetime
The debate concerning the ontological status of spacetime is usually portrayed
as a dilemma, namely substantivalism vs. relationalism.1 This would suggest
that substantivalism claims a single thesis T1 to be correct, with relationalism
asserting ¬T1. T1 is commonly taken to be that ‘spacetime is primitive (i.e. fun-
damental)’ (Lehmkuhl, 2018; Pooley, book manuscript).2 However, relational-
ism does not merely hold that ‘spacetime is derivative (i.e. non-fundamental)’
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1See Pooley (2013) and Dasgupta (2015) for some recent, accessible introductions to the
substantivalism–relationalism debate. The locus classicus is the Leibniz-Clarke correspon-
dence (Alexander, 1956/1717).
2Alternatively, substantivalism is sometimes construed as the combination of a thesis T ′1
that space(time) and its parts are real and a second thesis T ′2 that those real parts are ba-
sic/primitive/fundamental constitutents of our world. Relationalism is then portrayed as
denying the reality of space(time) (arguably by Leibniz himself (Alexander, 1956/1717)).
Such a portrayal of the debate is misleading. (Pooley’s title of his forthcoming book on the
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(¬T1), but adds that spacetime is derivative from matter. This leaves open the
option that spacetime could be derived from other (fundamental) degrees of
freedom.3 This view is dubbed emergent spacetime (Carlip, 2012; Matsubara,
2017); examples within this research programme include spacetime emerging
from (bosonic) strings, from quantum graphs (Konopka et al., 2006, 2008), from
condensed matter systems (Bain, 2013), from causal sets (Dowker, 2008) and
from spin networks (Rovelli and Vidotto, 2014).4 The debate is thus minimally
a trilemma.
All this suggests that the focus should not only be on the status of spacetime
(ST), but also on the status of matter (M). Let us introduce a second thesis
T2: ‘ST & M are ontologically distinct’. That is, ST & M do not ontologically
depend on each other in any way.5 ¬T2 is true iff there is any ontological connec-
tion at all between ST & M, whether that is a relation of identity, supervenience,
substantivalism–relationalism debate, The Reality of Spacetime (Pooley, book manuscript),
seems to suggest a similar misleading definition of relationalism, but the contents in fact agree
with the definitions in this paper.) First of all, T ′1 (reality) is implied by T
′
2 (primitiveness)
and thus redundant. Secondly, at least in the modern debate, relationalism holds that space
is derivable from relational, spatiotemporal properties of matter. Hence, space is as real as
the relational properties are, it is just not fundamental (Belot, 2011). As an analogy, consider
a chair from the perspective of a particle physicist. The particle physicist would not deny that
the chair is real, but would deny that it is fundamental. The chair is made up of equally real,
but more fundamental elementary particles (or fields, or strings, etc.). All spacetime theories
in this paper consider space(time) to be real; fundamentality is the issue, not reality (North,
2017).
3If neither material nor spatiotemporal, how else could these degrees of freedom be qual-
ified? What I mean by spacetime (matter) is that whatever one usually takes to be the
complete set of properties of spacetime (matter), such as topological structure, 3+1 dimen-
sions, light-cone structure (the appropriate dynamics), etc. (see also the end of Section 1 in
the main text). The other degrees of freedom will not have all of these properties, although
they might typically have some (cf. Le Bihan and Linnemann (2018)) or many of these (al-
though sometimes none at all, or these properties are not even coherent: for a huge quantum
graph (see main text) with many criss-cross connections, it is meaningless to attribute any
notion of dimensionality or topology at all). It may then be tempting to dub these other
degrees of freedom ‘proto-spacetime’, or ‘matter-like degrees of freedom’, instead of a wholly
novel name. This is mere semantics, and I will not dwell on it here. The point is that the
other degrees of freedom do not have the complete set of properties of either spacetime or
matter, and hence belong to a third category. The main text refers to various examples of
other degrees of freedom, with varying degrees of similarity to matter or spacetime proper.
4Sometimes some of these theories are interpreted as vindicating relationalism. Such dis-
cussions still operate under the mistaken assumption that the substantivalism–relationalism
distinction is an exhaustive dichotomy. They claim that, on these theories, spacetime is not
fundamental and take this to imply that relationalism is true. All this does imply is that
spacetime is derivative from relations between relata that are not spacetime points. Logically,
this leaves open that the relata could be either matter or other degrees of freedom that are
neither (fully) matter nor (fully) spatiotemporal. Neither causal sets, nor spin networks, for
example, are (fully; cf. fn.3) matter; hence, with spacetime not being fundamental in these
theories, they are, using the terminology of this paper, emergent spacetime theories rather
than relational theories. They would only be relational theories if relationalism were to be
redefined as the claim that the relata of spatioremporal relations are not spacetime points—
which would conflate my narrower definition of relationalism with emergent spacetime.
5But see Lehmkuhl (2011) for a large variety of ways in which matter does depend on the
metric in general relativity. It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss to what extent
those dependencies are forms of ontological dependence.
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T2 ¬T2
ST & M are distinct ST & M are not distinct
T1: ST is primitive dualistic substantivalism supersubstantivalism
¬T1: ST is derivative (dualistic) emergent ST relationalism
Table 1: Matrix of views on spacetime (ST) and matter (M)
grounding, constitution, ‘property of’, ‘excitation of’, ‘stable geometric pattern
of’, or anything else.6 We will not debate the comparative merits of these options
here. One could prima facie agree or disagree with T1 and T2 independently,
resulting in a 2× 2 matrix of categories, see Matrix 1. The term ‘supersubstan-
tivalism’ in this matrix is the popular name for monistic substantivalism, the
view that ST is the only primitive substance or entity. The ontological relation
of M to primitive ST could be cashed out in many ways, but as mentioned before
this paper is not the place to take a stance on this issue. Discussions of substan-
tivalism in the literature often implicitly assume dualistic substantivalism, by
implicitly adding T2 to T1. This suggests that emergentists and dualistic sub-
stantivalists have a lot of common ground, the former providing a constructive7
theory for the latter. For some it may even seem that the spirit of substantival-
ism is mainly contained within T2, in which case emergent spacetime perhaps
deserves the name ‘substantivalism’ more than supersubstantivalism. As this is
merely an issue of terminology I will not dwell on it here. Common ground may
similarly be found between supersubstantivalists and relationalists, which make
up the right half of the matrix.
By assigning emergent spacetime to the lower left corner of Matrix 1 only,
we have implicitly assumed a dualistic version of emergent spacetime, which
holds that spacetime emerges from more fundamental degrees of freedom, and
that matter is a distinct entity that lives within that emergent spacetime. One
may then ask what would happen to that matter in the (energy) regime where
spacetime does not emerge. It seems strange to hold on to a ‘containee’ once the
container is gone. To avoid this worry we could either opt for some sort of super-
emergent spacetime8, where spacetime is derivative from lower level degrees of
freedom and matter is in turn ontologically linked to that emergent spacetime (in
the regime where spacetime emerges only, of course), or for emergent spacetime
& matter, where both ST and M emerge directly from the fundamental degrees
of freedom. Alternatively, we could hold on to dualistic emergent spacetime
and face the issue head-on by extending our notion of matter to something
that can ‘live on the structure of the fundamental degrees of freedom’, even
in the regime where that structure does not resemble spacetime as we know
it. For instance, in the case of quantum graphity (Konopka et al., 2006, 2008),
6See Schaffer (2009) and Lehmkuhl (2009) for some examples.
7I have adopted this terminology from Einstein (1919).
8I prefer this terminology over emergent superspace(time), as superspace is already asso-
ciated both with supersymmetry and Wheeler’s superspace, and over emergent supersubstan-




ST & M are distinct ST & M are not distinct
T1: ST is primitive dualistic substantivalism supersubstantivalism
¬T1: ST is derivative dualistic emergent ST relationalism
(emergent ST & M ?) super-emergent ST
(emergent ST & M ?)
Table 2: Updated matrix of views on spacetime (ST) and matter (M)
T3 ¬T3
M is primitive M is derivative
T1: ST is primitive dualistic substantivalism supersubstantivalism
¬T1: ST is derivative dualistic emergent ST emergent ST & M
relationalism super-emergent ST
Table 3: Alternative matrix of views on spacetime (ST) and matter (M)
‘matter’ is represented by a quantized Hamiltonian placed on a graph. Only
in the low energy regime are the correct edges ‘switched on’ for the topology
of the vertices to reduce to a four-dimensional manifold. Outside that regime
one could still talk about matter as the solution to the Hamiltonian which lives
on the edges, even if the number of edges connected to each vertex exceeds the
amount required for ((3+1)-dimensional) spacetime to emerge. Similar stories
apply in tensor models and group field theory.9
Regardless of whether one is convinced of the coherence of this construction
of dualistic emergent spacetime, the other two categories remain prima facie
available. The corresponding updated version of our matrix of categories is Ma-
trix 2. In which category ‘emergent ST & M’ belongs depends on the details
of the theory. Can spacetime and matter emerge independently, or are they
dependent in such a way that an equivalent super-emergent ST theory could be
constructed? If it turns out that the majority of emergent spacetime theories
is not the group of dualistic emergent spacetime theories, a different categorisa-
tion may be more useful. After all, we would like a categorisation that splits up
the main four contenders (dualistic substantivalism, supersubstantivalism, re-
lationalism and the dominant form of emergent spacetime (and matter)). One
such categorisation, represented by Matrix 3, additionally solves the difficulties
with categorising ‘emergent ST & M’. It replaces T2, which compared spacetime
with matter, with T3 which focuses solely on the status of matter: ‘matter is
primitive’.
It is now only a small step to combine all three theses into a single matrix,
such that all six types of spacetime & matter theories are in different cells.
Merging the previous two matrices we obtain Matrix 4. Here we have assumed
for the emergent spacetime and matter theories (EST&M) that matter emerges
from the more fundamental degrees of freedom independently of the emergent
9I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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T3 ¬T3
M is primitive M is derivative
T1: ST is primitive Dual Subst SupSubst
¬T1: ST is derivative
T2: ST & M are distinct Dual EST EST&M
¬T2: ST & M are not distinct Rel SupEST
Table 4: Final matrix of views on spacetime (ST) and matter (M)
spacetime. When this is not the case such a view is to be categorised as a
super-emergent ST theory.10
Our final result, Matrix 4, provides us with a more comprehensive, exhaus-
tive and rigorous map of the space of logical possibilities than was provided by
just the orthodox substantivalism–relationalism distinction.
Finally, note that for any of the above views to be well-defined, it is crucial
to define spacetime and matter properly. Unfortunately this distinction is usu-
ally considered to be so basic and intuitive that many authors do not feel the
need to be explicit about what this distinction is supposed to be.11 However,
that this distinction is far from trivial becomes especially clear when we ask
the controversial question of whether the metric/gravitational field in general
relativity (GR) is considered to be part of spacetime or of matter (or both, or
neither) (Hoefer, 1996). On the one hand it encodes the geometric and hence
causal structure of spacetime: without such structure a manifold can hardly
be said to represent spacetime (Maudlin, 1988). On the other hand, in GR it
becomes a dynamical field satisfying an action-reaction principle and contain-
ing gravitational waves that carry energy (Earman and Norton, 1987; Read,
2018) (pace Hoefer (1996) and Dürr (2015)). In this sense it seems on a par
with matter fields. However, matter fields can be null over finite regions of the
manifold, whereas the metric field cannot (Hoefer, 1996). One may respond to
this that being null over finite regions does not imply that it does not exist (in
those regions): the Higgs field, for instance, has a non-minimal energy when
10If desired, it would be possible to hold on to a distinction between theories in which
matter is directly derivable from spacetime (‘super’ theories), and theories in which spacetime
and matter do depend on each other through the more fundamental degrees of freedom but
in which matter is not directly derivable from spacetime. Whereas the first three theses
concerned the ontology of entities, the required T4 concerns properties. Is matter a geometrical
property, or is it a fundamental, distinct property of the underlying degrees of freedom (either
spacetime points or more fundamental degrees of freedom)? If we formulate T4 as ‘matter is
a geometrical property’, it can be used to subdivide the ‘¬T3 column’ of our matrix. This not
only distinguishes the two types of EST&M theories that we were after, but also follows the
popular distinction in the literature between ‘super’ theories which reduce the matter degrees
of freedom to geometrical degrees of freedom—e.g. Wheeler (Misner et al., 1973) and Lehmkuhl
(2009, 2018)—and ‘super’ theories which hold that spacetime points or the more fundamental
degrees of freedom have two properties: geometrical and material (Schaffer, 2009). Lehmkuhl
dubs these positions radical and modest supersubstantivalism, respectively.
11A positive exception is the recent debate on spacetime functionalism, which is the view
that ‘to be spacetime is to play the spacetime role’. This literature does, of necessity, discuss
in detail what the spacetime role or concept is supposed to be (Baker, 2018; Knox, 2013,
2018).
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it takes on a null value (Maudlin, 1993). Here I will not take a stance on this
issue, but merely point out that it needs to be decided before the positions in
this paper will be well-defined.12 Another important issue concerns whether
primitive identities of spacetime points are to be included in spacetime (Hoefer,
1996; Pooley, 2002, book manuscript)—or perhaps spacetime points themselves
should be eliminated altogether (as per relationalism). I will return to this issue
in Section 2.1.
2 The new dilemma: emergent spacetime vs. sub-
stantivalism
In the previous section is was argued that ‘emergent spacetime’ is an important
third candidate in the debate concerning the ontological status of spacetime
(and matter). The emergent spacetime research programme is the focus of (the
remainder of) this paper; this section will continue our discussion of how it
relates to the other two candidates, whereas the subsequent two sections will
focus solely on the emergent spacetime research programme. In this section
I will make plausible that, insofar as substantivalism is an effective theory of
emergent ST, the strongest philosophical arguments against substantivalism do
not distinguish between substantivalism and emergent spacetime theories. It is
the arguments from physics that favour emergent spacetime over substantival-
ism. Hence, the philosophical debate should focus on the remaining dilemma
between emergent spacetime theories and relationalism. The subsequent section
continues by listing some questions that we would like the emergent spacetime
research programme to answer, followed by a section that applies those to a
quantum superfluid toy model in which spacetime emerges.
2.1 Philosophical arguments
Perhaps the strongest philosophical argument in the classical debate between
relationalism and substantivalism which favours relationalism is what is now
called the (static) Leibniz shift argument (Alexander, 1956/1717; Pooley, book
manuscript). Consider a possible world that is a solution to Newtonian grav-
ity (NG). If space were to exist as a primitive substance, one could generate
infinitely many metaphysically distinct possible worlds by Leibniz shifting this
original solution, that is by uniform translations of all matter relative to the
background space. Since the laws of Newtonian gravity only care about dis-
tances between material bodies and not about their absolute positions, all these
12(Further) skepticism concerning the tenability of a clear spacetime–matter dichotomy may
arise from Einstein’s views on the aether in General Relativity (Rynasiewicz, 1996), electro-
dynamical theory at the close of the nineteenth century (Rynasiewicz, 1996), the AdS/CFT
duality between one theory that prima facie looks like a theory of matter and another that
prima facie looks like a theory of gravity/spacetime (Le Bihan and Read, forthcoming), and
the dark matter vs. modified gravity debate (Martens and Lehmkuhl, manuscript).
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worlds related by Leibniz shifts are empirically equivalent solutions to NG. Sub-
stantivalism thus generates metaphysical distinctions without an empirical dif-
ference. It is considered sound methodology—namely a specific instance of an
Occamist norm, called the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles—to avoid such
distinctions when possible.
This argument concerns the physical relation between space and matter,
namely their relative positions, and not the absolute fundamentality of space-
time itself—it bears (at best) upon the relative fundamentality between space-
time and matter only. Hence, insofar as a dualistic ‘substantivalist’ theory is
an effective theory of another dualistic emergent spacetime theory, or a ‘super-
substantivalist’ theory an effective theory of another super-emergent spacetime
theory, the argument doesn’t distinguish between them, at least not in the
regime where spacetime emerges. Outside this regime it is unlikely that one
could even formulate the static Leibniz shift argument. Similarly, it is unclear
how one could formulate the argument against a theory of emergent spacetime
& matter, without knowing the details of such a theory.
A popular version of substantivalism that dissolves this argument (and simul-
taneously its relativistic brother the hole argument (Earman and Norton, 1987))
is sophisticated substantivalism (Hoefer, 1996; Pooley, 2002, book manuscript).
It is often assumed that a substantivalist must accept an infinity of distinct
yet qualitatively indiscernible worlds related by Leibniz shifts. However, sub-
stantivalism is merely a thesis about spacetime being mentioned on the list of
fundamental things in the ontology of our actual world. There is no need to com-
mit to claims about transworld-identity of parts of space(time). Without such
primitive identities of space(time) points, there is no way to distinguish all the
possible worlds related by a Leibniz shift. All such putative worlds collapse to
one: the actual world. Hence, insofar as space(time) prima facie emerges with-
out primitive identities of space(time) points in theories of (super)emergent
spacetime—i.e. sophisticated space(time) emerges—these theories can equally
well avoid the static Leibniz shift argument and hole argument.
A second classical argument against substantivalism in its original form, the
kinematic shift argument, targets the invariance of Newtonian physics under
a uniform velocity shift, that is the Galilean relativity principle. Once again
the substantivalist seems committed to a plurality of physically possible yet
observationally indiscernible worlds. Sophisticated substantivalism is of no avail
here, since the different worlds—although observationally indistinguishable—
are not qualitatively indistinguishable (pace Dewar (forthcoming))13. Whereas
body B may be at rest with respect to region R in the actual world, there is
no region R′ in the kinematically shifted world that is at rest with respect to
body B. However, this argument is commonly evaded by replacing Newtonian
space and time with Neo-Newtonian (also known as Galilean) spacetime. As
we only consider theories of emergent spacetime, these automatically evade the
kinematic shift argument. Further discussions of minor arguments in favour of
relationalism are provided by Pooley (book manuscript, 2013), but seem not to
13See Martens and Read (manuscript) for a critical response to Dewar.
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form any specific problem for emergent spacetime theories.
In fact, in response to one specific argument—which is problematic for rela-
tionalism but can be dealt with by substantivalism when it is slightly modified—
emergent spacetime theories may be even more successful than their effective,
substantivalist counterparts by naturally providing the required modification.
Several authors argue that parity violating laws of nature can only be explained
if spacetime has an orientational structure (Arntzenius, 2012; Earman, 1989;
Huggett, 2000; Martens, 2012; Pooley, 2003). It is then furthermore argued
that the relationalist cannot provide such a structure, whereas the substanti-
valist could postulate that absolute spacetime has this additional structure. If
spacetime instead emerges with a ready-made orientation, providing a dynami-
cal explanation for this orientation rather than having to postulate it, this would
be a strong point in favour of emergent spacetime.
2.2 Arguments from Physics
We have seen in the previous subsection that (unless spacetime emerges with
primitive identities) emergent spacetime theories fare as well, if not better,
against philosophical arguments that target substantivalism. In this subsec-
tion I will discuss arguments from physics that suggest that we should favour
emergent spacetime theories over their effective counterparts (i.e. substantival-
ism).
Arkani-Hamed (2010) and Seiberg (2005)14 argue that the concept of space-
time becomes useless at small length scales, as is often voiced by Arkani-Hamed’s
famous slogan ‘QM + gravity = spacetime is doomed’. They argue that, due to
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, we need to use an energy E > 1/r to probe
distances of size r. Without gravity there is no problem doing this, at least in
principle (but see Hossenfelder (2013)). However, when gravity is turned on the
concentration of energy required to probe distances below the Planck scale col-
lapses into a black hole. This singularity precludes an operational definition of
distances smaller than the Planck length (and times smaller than ∼ 10−43 s)15.
Arkani-Hamed adds to this that the size of the particle accelerator required to
probe such energies would cause the apparatus itself to collapse into a black
hole. He reminds us that every time we have encountered quantities or ideas in
the past that one cannot even in principle associate some operational meaning
with, it always turned out that those ideas were approximate and emerge from
something more fundamental.
14Ideas in this vicinity can be traced back to Bronstein (Bronstein, 1936; Gorelik, 2005),
Snyder (1947), Peres and Rosen (1960), Mead (1964, 1966) and many others, and have received
significant attention through Doplicher et al. (1995). See also Hossenfelder (2013), Rovelli and
Vidotto (2014) and Matsubara (2017).
15In Wüthrich’s (2005) interpretation of Snyder’s (1947) and Doplicher et al.’s (1995) argu-
ments, the operational definition of these distances is not possible because the created black
hole prevents signals from escaping and completing the measurement. However, even if the
measurement could (per impossibile) be completed, the problem would remain, because space-
time would have been destroyed, and it would not be clear what the signal is supposed to be
a measurement of.
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Arkani-Hamed cautions us to not conclude from this that there are atoms of
space(time). (Although this would not be a problem for the toy model discussed
below, or the abovementioned Quantum Graphity, it would prima facie seem to
be a problem for causal set theory which takes spacetime to be discrete (Dowker,
2008) and for spin networks (Rovelli and Vidotto, 2014).) The problem with
spacetime is not only a localised problem; there is no concept of spacetime at
all. This seems strange: General Relativity has been an extremely useful, if
not perfect tool at length scales larger than the Planck scale. Surely we expect
any fundamental theory replacing General Relativity to generate General Rel-
ativity as an effective theory at large length scales. Arkani-Hamed’s argument
why it cannot be true that there is new physics only below the Planck scale,
i.e. at sizes smaller than the supposed atoms of spacetime, is that this would go
against relativity. Scales are not absolute, but depend on one’s reference frame.
Hence, we would get new physics in one reference frame, but not in another
Lorentz-boosted reference frame. In other words, Arkani-Hamed argues, there
is no Lorentz covariant way to define atoms of spacetime. Here I think it is
important to remember what we are after. We want an operational definition of
length below the Planck scale. We never required lengths to be Lorentz invari-
ant, so why would we require atoms to be? Why could not spacetime emerge in
one reference frame, whereas in the other we observe the discrete structure of
spacetime? After all, it is very common to deal with the non-renormalisability of
quantum field theories by imposing a high energy/small length cut-off, despite
this cut-off of course not being Lorentz covariant either.16 But perhaps this anal-
ogy only makes salient that this cut-off is equally problematic. In this case we
have a deep problem to face, even before attempting to marry quantum theory
with gravity—a problem that I do not have the answer to. An alternative route
that one might take to avoid this whole problem is by considering theories where
Lorentz invariance breaks down before the discreteness sets in, or by deforming
Lorentz invariance as to allow an extra invariant scale (Amelino-Camelia, 2002).
In a similar vein, the case study in Section 4 will show that it is possible to get
an emergent Lorentz-covariant spacetime from a fundamental non-relativistic
spacetime (which in that example is continous though). Furthermore17, causal
set theory has found a way to retain local Lorentz invariance (in the continuum
approximation) despite its atomic nature, by imposing a stochastic dynamics for
generating the causal sets which itself is invariant under Lorentz transformations
(even though the created causal sets of course still break Lorentz invariance at
the scale where their discreteness becomes relevant).
Returning to Arkani-Hamed and Seiberg’s first point that spacetime is doom-
ed, it should be pointed out that this is an epistemological statement: when prob-
ing spacetime at small length scales we destroy it, which makes it impossible for
us to know anything about spacetime at such scales. This is not very surpris-
ing or novel—we are very used to measurements disturbing the system, eg. in
regular quantum physics. More importantly, in this paper we are interested in
16See also Donoghue (2012).
17See Hossenfelder’s excellent review (2013) for a discussion of alternatives.
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the ontology of spacetime. We cannot leap from the epistemological problem
of not being able to know the local structure of spacetime to the ontological
claim that there is no such thing—doesn’t the argument that something gets
destroyed in fact admit that there was something to begin with? One might
argue that an Occamist principle—do not multiply entities beyond necessity—
could close the gap between epistemology and ontology, but it is simply not clear
in this context that the non-emergentist is postulating any extra, unnecessary
entities. Spacetime is one big entity; all scales come as a package deal. It seems
to be a category mistake to treat the small scales as extra entities that we could
just throw out. In fact, isn’t it the emergentist who is postulating new entities?
Thus, I suggest we hold our horses and refrain from giving in to Arkani-Hamed’s
operationalist urge to conclude, merely from the epistemological argument that
we destroy spacetime when probing it at small scales, that there never was any
spacetime at those scales to begin with.
An ontological counterpart of the previous story is however suggested by
Wheeler (Misner et al., 1973). He reminds us that empty space is not empty:
the vacuum is the seat of the most violent physics we can imagine; macro-
physics is nothing compared to it. At small enough distances the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle allows creation of particle-antiparticle pairs out of the vac-
uum. Combining this with General Relativity, which tells us that the mass and
energy of those pairs curve the local spacetime, spacetime becomes very irregu-
lar at small scales, although it remains smooth at large scales. It is sometimes
argued that this already shows that General Relativity, which in its standard
form takes spacetime to be smooth at all scales, is not valid at the Planck scale
and is only an effective theory above that scale. However, up till here it seems
to me that there is no problem with incorporating quantum fluctuations within
General Relativity. Relativists assumed spacetime to be smooth at small scales,
since they were not aware that at those scales there is a huge amount of energy
popping up. Now we are aware of this, it follows straightforwardly from GR
that this energy creates an irregular spacetime at small scales. What is however
fatal for spacetime and GR is, as in Arkani-Hamed and Seiberg’s story, that be-
low the Planck scale the energy is so high that the spacetime not just becomes
irregular, but a black hole singularity is created. Spacetime does not exist at
all at those scales. Concluding, we do not need humans probing a small region
with high energy to destroy spacetime, quantum fluctuations do the job for us,
whether we are around or not.
Wheeler gives an additional reason why one cannot hold on to the concept
of spacetime at small length scales. Although quantum theory allows us to talk
about space (3-geometries) and time separately, we cannot combine them into
one spacetime at small length scales since these concepts cannot be simultane-
ously well-defined (Misner et al., 1973, §43). The best we could do is to talk
about a superspace which gives the amplitudes for the superposition of differ-
ent 3-geometries. But, as Isham (1994) points out, it becomes problematic to
understand physics if the causal structure fluctuates quantum mechanically at
these length scales (Tong, 2012).
Besides negative arguments, against the fundamentality of spacetime, there
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are also positive arguments for spacetime being emergent. A number of features
of GR is often considered to be suggestive of underlying microstructure (Linne-
mann and Visser, 2018); if one takes GR to be a theory of spacetime, this would
suggest that spacetime is emergent. Arguably the strongest such hint arises
from black hole thermodynamics. Black holes are specific metric solutions of
GR. They can be described by a few macroscopic parameters which turn out to
obey laws that are formally analogous to the laws of thermodynamics (Bardeen
et al., 1973; Beckenstein, 1972; Kiefer, 2007; Smarr, 1973). We standardly take
thermodynamic systems to have a non-trivial underlying microstructure, say a
gas of particles obeying statistical mechanics. The idea is then that black hole
thermodynamics indicates that a black hole, or even the metric in GR in gen-
eral, has a non-trivial underlying microstructure. For this to be a conclusive
argument, one would have to show that the analogy is exact, that this for-
mal analogy makes black holes thermodynamic systems in all relevant aspects,
and that one could not provide a coherent physical interpretation of black hole
thermodynamics without inferring underlying microstructure (Dougherty and
Callender, 2016; Prunkl and Timpson, 2016; Wallace, 2018a,b). I will not dwell
here on the subtleties of that debate; the interested reader is referred to Lin-
nemann and Visser (2018)—and references therein, especially Jacobson (1995),
Padmanabhan (2010) and Verlinde (2011)—for a comprehensive appraisal of
these hints towards a microstructure underlying GR.
We are forced to give up either General Relativity and spacetime at small
length scales, or quantum theory, or both.18 The fact that an extrapolation
of the strength of the electromagnetic, strong and weak force to smaller scales
results in a single intersection around the Planck scale19 suggests that quantum
theory remains valid at least up to that scale. (It should be admitted though
that gravity joins them not much later.) Although the entire state of the art
of quantum gravity is still fragmentary, and it is difficult to reach any definite
conclusions, this intersection plus the other arguments in this section do strongly
suggest that spacetime is not fundamental. Hence, in the remainder of this
paper we will focus on theories that assume General Relativity loses out and
could use replacement.20 As a bonus we hope to solve some mysteries that
quantum theory has currently left unsolved.
The classical debate about the status of space(time) started out as a dilemma
between substantivalism and relationalism. After transforming this into a trilemma
by pointing out the option of emergent spacetime at the start of the paper, we
have now narrowed this back down to an overarching dilemma, albeit a new
one: relationalism vs. emergent spacetime (and matter). We arrived at this
conclusion mainly because arguments from physics suggest favouring emergent
18Semi-classical gravity would be an exception, as it claims that (a slightly modified version
of) GR is true at all scales without having to be quantized. This approach however is not
without its problems (Wüthrich, 2005).
19This intersection is especially accurate if supersymmetry is imposed.
20It should be flagged though that we do not understand how to do standard quantum
theory without a background spacetime, although e.g. Quantum Graphity might be a way of
avoiding this.
11
spacetime theories over their effective counterparts (i.e. substantivalism); more-
over, emergent spacetime theories fare at least as well as substantivalism against
philosophical arguments that target substantivalism.
3 Questions we hope the emergent spacetime re-
search programme will answer
In this section I will suggest some questions one may want to keep in mind
when looking into (the philosophical commitments and consequences of) several
versions of emergent spacetime theories. In the next section these questions
will return when discussing a case study. It is important to note that most of
these questions are opportunities for emergent spacetime theories rather than
difficulties. They are left unanswered by non-emergent theories. If emergent
spacetime theories fail to answer them, then nothing is lost; if they manage to
answer some of them then this provides a substantive advantage.
Is the theory a theory of emergent ST,
super-emergent ST, or emergent ST & M?
(Q1)
What notion of emergence is used, and how does this relate to
the notion of emergence within the relationalist approach?
(Q2)
The philosophical notion of emergent properties or entities usually refers
to properties or entities that supervene on more fundamental properties and
entities without being reducible to them (but see O’Connor and Wong (2012) for
an overview of differing definitions). The vague notion of irreducibility employed
here can be cashed out in several ways. One option is epistemic irreducibility:
the systems under consideration are so complex that we, humans with limited
cognitive capacities that we are, are unable to express the emergent properties in
terms of the fundamental properties. Here we are more interested in two other
versions of emergentism: inter-theoretical and ontological emergentism. The
first appears when the vocabulary used in the emergent theory is so different
from the vocabulary of the fundamental theory that there is no direct mapping
from concepts in one theory to (a combination of) concepts in the other theory.
Ontological emergence refers to new primitive entities or properties arising when
fundamental entities form a certain pattern. Note that these novel entities are
more than just the composition of the fundamental entities; when a new entity
emerges it gets added to the list of all fundamental things that exist in the
world.
It is controversial whether there are in fact any instances of these latter
two types of emergence.21 Perhaps our theories of emergent spacetime refer
to a broader, common-sense notion of emergence (Matsubara, 2017). Perhaps
21Crowther (2014) argues that the ontological-epistemological emergence distinction is very
unhelpful, particularly in the context of theories of emergent spacetime.
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nothing more is meant than that, in some regime, the fundamental degrees of
freedom form a pattern which constitutes spacetime. Philosophically speaking
this would just be supervenience or constitution. This is the notion of emergent
spacetime, if any, that seems to be used by the relationalist. The instantaneous
relative particle distances and facts about time intervals between particle con-
figurations that the relationalist has available allow for the construction of a
background spacetime that elegantly encodes these facts. This does not imply
that spacetime should be attributed a primitive metaphysical status, irreducible
to the primitive relational facts. Similarly, emergent spacetime theorists may
have no intention of making claims about the relation between two theories:
emergence may just refer to the fundamental degrees of freedom only having
the right structure to be considered spacetime in one (energy) regime, whereas
spacetime does not so arise in other regimes within that same theory.
It is probably fair to say that emergence is a notoriously controversial notion
in the philosophy of science. Q2 may then not only be seen as the task of
applying philosophical tools to refine our understanding of physical theories,
but also (or perhaps mainly) the other way round: theories in which spacetime
emerges may provide fruitful casestudies for philosophers to (finally!) get clear
on the thorny notion of emergence. Such a science-first approach to the notion
of emergence is advocated by Crowther (2014).
What happens to the notion of matter in the regime where
spacetime does not emerge?
(Q3)
What additional structure emerges compared to the standard
construal of spacetime manifolds?
A. Primitive identities?
B. An orientational structure?
(Q4)
A. Laughlin’s Mystery of Mysteries (2005):
Why do the fundamental forces and spacetime have any symmetry at all?
B. Brown’s Mystery of Mysteries (2005):
Why are (almost) all forces and spacetime locally Lorentz covariant?
C. Pauli’s Mystery of Mysteries (Gardner, 1964/1990):
Why does only the weak force violate Brown’s Mystery of Mysteries
by violating parity maximally [and CP a bit], and not all three forces?
(Q5)
Brown (2005) points out that it seems too much of a coincidence that all
three of our fundamental (non-gravitational) interactions (electromagnetism,
the strong force and the weak force) share the same symmetries, local Lorentz
covariance. As with all such ‘coincidences’ in the history of science, this sug-
gests an underlying unifying explanation. Laughlin (2005) makes the stronger
point that, even if there would be no such universality of symmetry, we would
13
still require an explanation of the symmetries of each force separately. Symme-
tries do not cause dynamics—despite particle physicists adopting such a view
when constructing Lagrangian theories such as the Standard Model of Particle
Physics—but are a property of dynamics (or spacetime) which stands in need
of explanation. In fact, the universality pointed out by Brown is not strictly
correct. All three interactions are covariant under the restricted Lorentz group,
but only the strong force and electromagnetism are covariant under the full
Lorentz group. This is the real mystery, according to Pauli: why does only the
weak force violate parity? Hopefully theories of emergent spacetime (and mat-
ter) can shed some light on these mysteries, especially those theories in which
all dynamics become connected through a single set of fundamental degrees of
freedom all governed by the same dynamical law.
Does the emergent spacetime theory explain inertial motion? (Q6)
In Newtonian physics inertial motion is postulated. Perhaps emergent space-
time theories will tell us why geodesics are the way they are, and, in case of
theories in which there is a link between matter and spacetime, it may be ex-
plained why matter follows these geodesics. It is often argued that inertial mo-
tion is already explained by the geodesic principle in General Relativity, which
holds that inertial motion can be derived from Einstein’s field equations (Brown,
2005; Ehlers and Geroch, 2004; Geroch and Jang, 1975; Geroch and Weatherall,
manuscript; Weatherall, 2017). Whether the geodesic theorem indeed succeeds
in removing the need of postulating inertial motion is controversial (Malament,
2009; Sus, manuscript; Tamir, 2012; Yang, 2013), but even if it does succeed
a deeper explanation may be gained from certain theories in which not only
spacetime but also gravity itself is emergent.
Why does spacetime emerge with 3+1 dimensions? (Q7)
4 A case study: quantum superfluids
Bain (2008, 2013) discusses the emergence of relativistic spacetime from con-
densed matter systems, specifically quantum liquid toy models such as superfluid
Helium-3 and superfluid Helium-4.22 For instance, the ground state of super-
fluid Helium-4 is a Bose-Einstein condensate. The corresponding non-relativistic






†φ− κ(φ†φ)2, i = 1, 2, 3, (1)
22As pointed out by an anonymous referee, the idea of spacetime emerging from a super-
fluid/condensate is realised (partially) in group field theory, at least for cosmological space-
times which can be seen to arise as condensates of the microscopic group field theory ‘atoms’,
in turn representable as spin networks or simplicial structures.
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where m is the mass of the Helium-4 atoms, µ the chemical potential. One can
then obtain an effective field theory for this Lagrangian, valid at low energies,
by expanding φ around the ground state (φ =
√
ρeiθ, ρ = ρ0 + δρ, θ = θ0 + δθ),









such that L4He = L0[ρ0, θ0] + Leff[δθ], where we have substituted δθ for θ for





−ggµν∂µθ∂νθ, µ, ν = 0, 1, 2, 3, (3)
where g = g(v, ρ,m). This Lagrangian now formally describes a massless scalar
field in a (3+1)-dimensional curved relativistic spacetime! Relativistic spacetime
has emerged from a quantum liquid (living on a non-relativistic spacetime)!
In this emergent spacetime theory we start out with (non-relativistic) space-
time-like fundamental degrees of freedom and matter-like degrees of freedom, a
fundamental condensate, living ‘on’ the former set of degrees of freedom. Matter
as we know it then emerges as collective modes of the ground state of the fun-
damental condensate; in this regime the dynamics of the emergent matter is so
that it mimics living in a relativistic spacetime (or in other words, its dynamics
are most simply described using a mathematical theory containing a relativistic
background). The most straightforward interpretation of this toy model is that
we should categorise it as an ‘emergent spacetime & matter’ theory (Q1): in a
certain regime the (matter-like) fundamental degrees of freedom (which live on
spacetime-like degrees of freedom) mimic what we normally consider matter liv-
ing in what we normally consider (relativistic) spacetime. Although this seems
the best choice from the three available types of emergent spacetime theories
distinguished earlier, this will not convince a relationalist. A relationalist would
maintain that the spacetime-like fundamental degrees of freedom should not be
interpreted as fundamental entities, but rather as properties of the matter-like
degrees of freedom. Matter and spacetime as we know them then emerge through
composite behaviour of these matter-like entities and their spatiotemporal-like
properties.
Bain seems to construe the notion of emergence that arises in this example
as a combination of ontological and inter-theoretic emergence (Q2). The effec-
tive theory is obtained from the fundamental theory by integrating out the high
energy degrees of freedom. For this reason, Bain argues, the effective theory is
a truly novel theory, as it becomes irreducible to the fundamental theory and
is committed to a different ontology (e.g. a relativistic spacetime). It seems
strange to interpret this as ontological emergence—that is in the regime where
the effective theory is valid it replaces the fundamental theory and its ontology.
Although there is no logical contradiction in the ontology (the list of fundamen-
tal things) of our actual world changing over time, it seems implausible that
a specific combination of fundamental things creates a new fundamental entity
or property. Even more implausible is that that primitive (i.e. fundamental)
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thing should disappear again if the world exits the regime in which the effective
theory is valid; something that is primitive does, by definition, not depend on
other things for it to endure. If, on the other hand, Bain’s story is to be in-
terpreted as emergence being a relation between the fundamental and effective
theories, this suggests that spacetime is a notion which can only be understood
within the effective theory, which we know to be merely a useful tool which
is no true representation of the ontology of our actual world. Such elimina-
tivism about spacetime seems too strong. Both the fundamental theory and
the effective theories are Lagrangian theories—the effective theory is obtained
as an approximation to the fundamental theory. Our original theory already
contained spacetime-like degrees of freedom, the only thing that changes is that
in the low energy regime these properties (together with the matter-like degrees
of freedom) approximately mimic relativistic properties. It would be an exag-
geration to claim that the fundamental (and hence the only correct) theory of
our world has no grip on the notion of relativistic spacetime.
It seems that a broader notion of emergence is appropriate here. Within a
single theory, relativistic spacetime emerges in a certain regime because in that
regime the fundamental entities and properties of the theory combine in the
right way to approximately mimic what we call relativistic spacetime. No dy-
namical ontologies, or relations between theories are required. A simple notion
of constitution or supervenience suffices.
Whether this spacetime theory explains inertia (Q6) remains undecided since
the current toy models fail to fully reproduce General Relativity (see Bain
(2008); although multi-component Bose Einstein condensates seem to have a
better chance at succeeding (Girelli et al., 2009, 2008; Sidoni, 2011)). It would
be too strong to claim that this theory has explained the dimensionality of
spacetime (Q7), since this follows from the dimensionality of the background
spatiotemporal degrees of freedom which remains unexplained itself (but see
Hall’s example of quantum Hall liquids which seem to do a better job). A
similar story applies to the explanation of (Lorentz) symmetry (Q5). These
symmetries somewhat miraculously appear in the effective theory, from the un-
derlying dynamics and the Galilean symmetry of the background spacetime-like
degrees of freedom, but this only leaves us with the question of why those de-
grees of freedom had that symmetry. (It is worth pointing out though that these
systems do allow us to learn something about the relative scale of fundamental
discreteness vs. Lorentz invariance: a breakdown of the effective hydrodynam-
ics can occur before or after the breakdown of the emergent Lorentz invariance.
This can be studied in detail.23) Nothing is learned when it comes to the ques-
tion of why only the weak force violates parity, but we would not have expected
that much from a mere toy model. Fortunately we do not need to worry about
spacetime emerging with primitive identities (Q4), as long as the fundamental
degrees of freedom have no primitive identities.
23I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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5 Outlook
In this paper I have argued that the debate between substantivalism and rela-
tionalism knows an important third player: theories in which spacetime is an
emergent concept. In fact, although the philosophical arguments do not distin-
guish between emergent spacetime theories and substantivalism, it is modern
physics that suggests that substantivalism should be given up in favour of emer-
gent spacetime. I have provided a non-exhaustive list of philosophical questions
one should consider when discussing the merits of a theory of emergent space-
time (compared to its opponent in the new, remaining dilemma: relationalism).
These questions have been discussed in the context of a superfluid toy model
of an emergent spacetime theory. Many questions cannot be answered yet or
have an unsatisfactory answer. Future work should discuss whether more ma-
ture examples of emergent spacetime theories (see Carlip (2012) for a list) prove
more successful in answering these questions, and hence form viable candidates
in opposing relationalism.
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